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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO.  43447 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2009-937 
      ) 
HYRUM WILLIAM ANDERSON,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
      ) 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-two-year-old Hyrum William Anderson 
pleaded guilty to felony grand theft by possession of stolen property.  The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  During the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court granted 
Mr. Anderson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion and placed him on probation 
for a period of fourteen years.  Mr. Anderson subsequently admitted to violating his 
probation, and the district court revoked probation and retained jurisdiction once more.  
The district court then placed Mr. Anderson back on probation.  After Mr. Anderson 
admitted to further probation violations, the district court revoked probation and again 
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retained jurisdiction.  On appeal, Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation and retained jurisdiction. 
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mike Larson called the Boise Police Department to report his shop had been 
burglarized and thousands of dollars’ worth of tools taken.  (Presentence Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.56.)1  A few months later, Mr. Larson told the police he had seen 
some of the items at a second-hand sports store.  (PSI, p.56.)  The police investigated 
and learned Mr. Anderson had brought the items to the store.  (PSI, p.56.)  The next 
month, the police discovered Mr. Anderson had pawned several items at area pawn 
shops.  (PSI, p.56.)  An officer arrested Mr. Anderson as he was attempting to pawn 
more items.  (PSI, p.56.) 
The State filed a Complaint alleging Mr. Anderson had committed the offense of 
grand theft by possession of stolen property, felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-
2403(4) and 18-2407(1).  (R., pp.11-12.)  After Mr. Anderson waived a preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate bound him over to the district court.  (See R., p.24.)  The State 
then filed an Information charging Mr. Anderson with the above offense.  (R., pp.28-29.)  
Mr. Anderson initially entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.33.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Anderson agreed to plead guilty to felony 
grand theft by possession of stolen property.  (R., pp.38-46.)  The district court imposed 
a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.49-51.) 
                                            
1 All cites to the PSI refer to the 163-page PDF electronic document, which includes the 
2009 and 2015 Presentence Reports. 
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 Mr. Anderson later filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion.  (R., pp.54-
56.)  In the Rule 35 motion, Mr. Anderson asserted that after the district court entered 
the order retaining jurisdiction, he had been incarcerated in the Ada County Jail on an 
unrelated charge.  (R., p.54.)  That left him unable to go on his “rider.”  (R., p.55.)  
Mr. Anderson was concerned the district court would lose jurisdiction before he 
completed his rider.  (R., p.55.)  He also requested the district court reconsider the 
length of his sentence.  (R., p.55.)   
Following a hearing on the Rule 35 motion, the district court granted the motion 
and placed Mr. Anderson on probation for a period of fourteen years.  (R., pp.59-67.)  
The district court’s special conditions of probation required Mr. Anderson to acquire a 
GED or high school diploma and to remain fully employed or enrolled as a full time 
student.  (R., p.64.)  However, the district court also placed Mr. Anderson under the 
special condition that he “not have a checking account or credit cards unless specifically 
approved by his probation officer.”  (R., p.64.) 
About a year later, the State filed a Motion for Probation Violation (Agents 
Warrant), alleging Mr. Anderson had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.  
(R., pp.148-49.)  Mr. Anderson initially denied the alleged violations.  (R., pp.150-51.)  
He later admitted to violating his probation by using marijuana.  (R., p.153; see 
R., p.148.)  The district court revoked Mr. Anderson’s probation, executed the sentence, 
and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.156-58.)  After Mr. Anderson participated in a 
Therapeutic Community rider (see, e.g., R., pp.162-65), the district court placed him 
back on probation for the remainder of the fourteen-year period.  (R., pp.298-302.)   
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About two-and-a-half years later, the State filed another Motion for Probation 
Violation (Agents Warrant), alleging Mr. Anderson had violated his probation.  
(R., pp.315-17.)   The State later filed an Amended Motion for Probation Violation 
(Agents Warrant), and a Second Amended Motion for Probation Violation (Agents 
Warrant), each with additional alleged violations.  (R., pp.331-33, 356-58.)  
Mr. Anderson subsequently admitted to violating his probation by committing the new 
crime of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, committing the new crime 
of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and committing the new crime of 
misdemeanor obstructing or resisting an officer.2  (R., p.381; see R., pp.357-58.)  The 
district court accepted Mr. Anderson’s admissions.  (R., p.381.) 
Before the probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Anderson filed a Notice of 
Intent to Motion for Rule 35 Reduction at Disposition.  (R., p.382.)  At the hearing, the 
State recommended that the district court execute the sentence.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.23-24.)  
Mr. Anderson recommended that the district court place him back on probation, or 
reduce his sentence on the district court’s own Rule 35 motion.  (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-25.)  
The district court indicated that Mr. Anderson did not have the right to pursue another 
Rule 35 motion because of his earlier Rule 35 motion.3  (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-21.)  The district 
court revoked Mr. Anderson’s probation, executed the original sentence, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.384-87.)  The district court declined to reduce Mr. Anderson’s 
sentence on its own Rule 35 motion.  (Tr., p.45, L.24 – p.46, L.2.)   
                                            
2 Mr. Anderson was found guilty of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance 
following a jury trial, and pleaded guilty to the latter two new crimes.  (See Tr., p.11, 
L.18 – p.13, L.14.)  The jury acquitted him of a felony possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver charge.  (See Tr., p.19, Ls.10-14; R., p.357.)   
3 The relevant part of Rule 35 provides that “no defendant may file more than one 
motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.”  I.C.R. 35(b).   
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Mr. Anderson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order 
Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and Retaining Jurisdiction.  (R., pp.388-90.) 
  
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Anderson’s probation and 
retained jurisdiction? 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Anderson’s Probation 
And Retained Jurisdiction 
 
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation and retained jurisdiction, because the district court could only reasonably 
conclude from his conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose.  Thus, 
the district court should have followed Mr. Anderson’s recommendation and placed him 
back on probation. 
A district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under 
certain circumstances.  I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 & 20-222.  “A district court’s decision 
to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court 
abused its discretion.”  State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009).  In reviewing a 
district court’s discretionary decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry “to determine 
whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards, and 
reached its standards by an exercise of reason.”  Id. at 105-06. 
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation 
proceeding.  Id. at 105.  First, the appellate court reviews the district court’s finding on 
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“whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.”  Id.  “If it is determined that 
the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second question is 
what should be the consequences of that violation.”  Id. 
Mr. Anderson concedes he admitted to violating his probation.  (R., p.381; see 
R., pp.357-58.)  When a probationer admits to a direct violation of his probation 
agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.  State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 
49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992).  Thus, this Court may go to the second step of the analysis and 
determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
Mr. Anderson’s probation.   
As Idaho’s appellate courts have held, “If a knowing and intentional probation 
violation has been proved, a district court’s decision to revoke probation will be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106 (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001)).  However, probation may not be revoked 
arbitrarily.  State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989).  The purpose of 
probation is to provide an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and 
supervision.  Peterson, 123 Idaho at 50.  Thus, in determining whether to revoke 
probation, a court must consider whether probation is meeting the objective of 
rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.  State v. Upton, 127 
Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995).  The district court may revoke probation if it reasonably 
concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative 
purpose.  Adams, 114 Idaho at 1055.  The district court may consider the defendant’s 
conduct both before and during the probationary period.  State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 
392 (Ct. App. 1987).   
7 
Here, the district court could only reasonably conclude from Mr. Anderson’s 
conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose.  The admitted probation 
violations came from Mr. Anderson’s relapse into substance abuse, an interruption in 
his rehabilitation while on probation.  Following a jury trial, Mr. Anderson was acquitted 
of misdemeanor charges of battery, petit theft, and unlawful entry.  (See PSI, p.6.)  
Those charges stemmed from a disagreement he had with an ex-girlfriend.  (See PSI, 
p.9.)  However, Mr. Anderson’s parents disowned him before his acquittal.  (See PSI, 
p.3; Tr., p.37, Ls.18-22.)  At the probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Anderson 
told the district court he had been residing at his parents’ house, but they changed the 
locks on him.  (Tr., p.37, Ls.20-22.)  Mr. Anderson was unable to get his phone and his 
truck, which he needed for his waste oil collection business.  (See PSI, p.3; Tr., p.37, 
L.22 – p.38, L.2.)  He reported his probation officer refused to help him get his 
belongings and told him there was no funding to give him any resources.  (Tr., p.38, 
Ls.17-25.) 
Unfortunately, Mr. Anderson relapsed into substance abuse soon after his 
parents disowned him.  In the presentence investigation questionnaire, Mr. Anderson 
stated he felt he had no help and had nowhere to turn, and was stressed and 
depressed.  (PSI, p.3.)  Apart from losing his family, he also lost his father as a friend 
and business partner.  (See PSI, p.3; Tr., p.41, p.16 – p.42, L.3.)  Mr. Anderson was 
able to get another truck and other equipment for his business, and went to Oregon to 
make an oil delivery.  (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.39, L.1 – p.40, L.1.)  But on the way back, he 
crossed into Washington and bought spice, a synthetic cannabinoid.  (PSI, pp.3, 12; 
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Tr., p.40, L.1-3.)  The authorities found the drugs after Mr. Anderson was pulled over 
between Horseshoe Bend and Boise for reckless driving.  (See PSI, p.3; R., p.359.) 
Mr. Anderson informed the district court the spice was for his personal use and 
he felt it was very addictive.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.3-4.)  During the presentence investigation, 
Mr. Anderson stated he was embarrassed and did not tell anyone he was using, and he 
was “so overwhelmed by everything else” that he did not think about the consequences 
of his relapse.  (PSI, p.12.)  He told the district court, “I felt like I was obviously self-
medicating to deal with stresses and depression.”  (Tr., p.43, Ls.6-7.) 
Mr. Anderson also told the district court that, before his parents disowned him, “I 
had done everything that was asked of me on probation.  I never missed a UA, never 
failed a UA, any classes anyway.”  (Tr., p.41, L.23 – p.42, L.1.)  Thus, it appears the 
relapse and resulting criminal charges were an interruption in Mr. Anderson’s 
rehabilitation while on probation, as opposed to an indication that probation was not 
achieving its rehabilitative purpose.  The relapse was an unfortunate response to 
Mr. Anderson being disowned by his parents and having his business thrown into flux.  
However, that bad choice alone does not show Mr. Anderson’s probation was failing to 
achieve its rehabilitative purpose. 
Actually, Mr. Anderson was being rehabilitated while on probation.  
Mr. Anderson’s commitment to running a small business shows he was being 
rehabilitated.  As discussed above, Mr. Anderson had been operating a waste oil 
collection business with his parents before his parents disowned him.  (See PSI, p.11.)  
Mr. Anderson was so committed to that line of work that he pulled together the 
equipment to continue collecting waste oil after his parents froze him out of the family 
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business.  (See Tr., p.39, Ls.1-17.)  That was despite the special condition of probation 
that Mr. Anderson “not have a checking account or credit cards unless specifically 
approved by his probation officer.”  (See R., p.64.)  He stated during the presentence 
investigation that he hoped to return to operating that business upon release.  (PSI, 
p.11.)  At the probation revocation disposition hearing, Mr. Anderson’s counsel similarly 
informed the district court that Mr. Anderson “feels like he could resume that business.  
He has some things still in place that he could salvage that business. . . .”  (Tr., p.32, 
Ls.4-7.)  
Alongside his commitment to running his small business, Mr. Anderson’s 
relationship with his son, Hyrum Anderson Jr., demonstrates he was being rehabilitated.  
During the presentence investigation, Mr. Anderson stated:  “My relationship with my 
son is very good he is my world, I get him usually every weekend and any other day if I 
have something going on that I would like him to be with me for me.”  (PSI, p.10.)  
Mr. Anderson listed getting caught up on his child support and getting his own place for 
himself and his son as two of his goals.  (PSI, p.13.) 
At the probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Anderson told the district court 
that his admitted probation violations have “affected my relationship with my son 
obviously.”  (See Tr., p.42, Ls.12-13.)  He stated he had “definitely tried to reach out to 
my son since I’ve been in here,” but Mr. Anderson’s phone calls were disconnected and 
his ex-wife was unwilling to talk to his friends about him.  (Tr., p.42, Ls.15-20.)  
According to Mr. Anderson, “that has been a huge punishment in itself.  I have not had 
one, have not been able to contact my son whatsoever.”  (Tr., p.42, Ls.22-24.) 
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Further, Mr. Anderson’s remorse indicates that probation was achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose.  He told the district court at the probation violation disposition 
hearing, “I would like to first off say that I’m not trying to blame anybody for my actions.  
I completely and utterly take responsibility for my humiliating events that have brought 
me in front of you today.”  (Tr., p.37, Ls.5-9.)  Mr. Anderson also stated, “I have no one 
to blame for myself for my actions and my choices.  I chose to pick up that Spice.  I 
chose to smoke it . . . .”  (Tr., p.43, Ls.3-5.)   Mr. Anderson’s remorse shows that, even 
though his relapse was a bad choice, he was internalizing the rehabilitative messages 
from probation. 
In light of the above, the district court could only reasonably conclude from 
Mr. Anderson’s conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose.  Thus, 
the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Anderson’s probation and 
retained jurisdiction. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the above reasons, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court’s order revoking probation and remand the case with an instruction that 
Mr. Anderson be placed back on probation.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be 
remanded to the district court for a new probation violation disposition hearing. 
 DATED this 23rd day of November, 2015. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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